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INTRODUCTION
Over the last fifteen years, state legislatures have enacted numerous
tough-on-crime statutes that mandate restrictive parole conditions for
convicted sex offenders returning to the community. Often, new legisla-
tion in this area comes as a knee-jerk response to high-profile cases of
paroled offenders who go on to re-offend in particularly gruesome ways.
For example, in 1994, repeat sex offender Jesse K. Timmendequas kid-
napped, raped, and murdered his seven-year-old neighbor, Megan
Kanka.' But Megan was not Jesse Timmendequas' first victim. Unbe-
knownst to the Kanka family, Jesse Timmendequas was a two-time
convicted child molester who had a history of preying on young chil-
dren.2 The community was devastated. A media firestorm ensued. By
the time Jesse Timmendequas made it to trial, local tabloids and news-
papers had already branded him "The Monster."'
Almost everyone has heard of Megan's story, or one similar to it,
because those are the stories that make the news. The focus of popular
media and lawmakers on the particularly appalling cases,' such as Me-
gan's case, has shaped the way we as a society have come to think about
sex offenders more broadly. Because of the particularly gruesome cases,
many individuals consider all sex offenders to be aggressive, predatory,
and violently dangerous people who should not be allowed in public.'
1. William Glaberson, Man at Heart ofMegan's Law Convicted ofHer Grisly Murder, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/31/nyregion/man-at-heart-
of-megan-s-law-convicted-of-her-grisly-murder.html [hereinafter Glaberson, Man at
Heart].
2. Id.; see also William Glaberson, Killer in Megan' Case Is Sentenced to Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 21, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/21/nyregion/killer-
in-megan-case-is-sentenced-to-death.html [hereinafter Glaberson, Killer in 'Megan'
Case].
3. David Kocieniewski, Death Penalty Is Affirmed in Megan's Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
12, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/12/nyregion/death-penalty-is-affirmed-in-
megan-case.html.
4. See generally Tim Bynum et al., Recidivism of Sex Offenders, CTR. FOR SEX OFFENDER
MGMT. 1 (May 2001), http://www.csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.pdf ("In many instanc-
es, policies and procedures for the management of sex offenders have been driven by
public outcry over highly publicized sex offenses. However, criminal justice practi-
tioners must avoid reactionary responses that are based on public fear of this
population. Instead, they must strive to make management decisions that are based
on the careful assessment of the likelihood of recidivism.").
5. See, e.g., Robb London, Strategy on Sex Crimes is Prison, Then Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/08/news/strategy-on-sex-crimes-is-
prison-then-prison.html; Gerry Shih, Sex Offender Allow to Live Near School, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/us/07sfoffender.html;
Sex Offender Registration Laws Pit Victims' Rights Against Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
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Although what Jesse Timmendequas did was abhorrent, the legisla-
tion enacted in the wake of his crime went far beyond making sure we
know the pedophiles or pedophile-murderers living in our neighbor-
hoods. Megan's name now lends itself to a host of state laws requiring
the state to notify neighbors when a sex offender moves into the neigh-
borhood.' The term "sex offender" is intentionally broad, covering
everyone from voyeurs and exhibitionists to rapists and child molesters.
Yet, Megan's Laws treat them the same way, ignoring some crucial ques-
tions: Are all sex offenders alike? Are they all monsters?
In reality, the majority of sex crimes are not the sort of violent
rapes that are highlighted in news stories.! Furthermore, the categori-
cal treatment of sex offenders-despite significant differences in their
crimes-has led to impulsive and overreaching new restrictions once
they are paroled.
Parole restrictions for sex offenders take a variety of forms. In addi-
tion to the Megan's Laws discussed above, which are technically
"collateral consequences"' and can last for indeterminate and varying
amounts of time, some states also prohibit sex offenders from living,
working, or coming within certain distances of schools, parks, daycares,
and other places where children congregate, for the duration of their
parole.9 Some states also require paroled sex offenders to wear Global
Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices so the state may monitor the
Feb. 20, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/ 1 993/02/20/us/sex-offender-registration-
laws-pit-victims-rights-against-civil-rights.html.
6. Glaberson, Killer in Megan' Case, supra note 2.
7. See Wendy Coch, Despite High-Profile Cases, Sex-Offense Crimes Decline, U.S.A. To-
DAY, Aug. 24, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-2
4 -sex-crimes-
coverx.htin ("The headline-grabbing cases tend to be anomalies, because kids are
rarely abused by strangers, and even less often killed.").
8. Individuals who are convicted of crimes face two different types of consequences:
direct and collateral. Direct consequences include the term of imprisonment and/or
probation/supervisory release that may be imposed as a sentence by the court. Collat-
eral consequences, on the other hand, stem from the "fact of conviction rather than
the sentence of the court." Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and
Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually
Violent Predators," 93 MiNN. L. REv. 670, 678 (2008). Collateral consequences vary
from state to state, but can include involuntary civil commitment, sex offender regis-
try requirements, and other limitations on employment or housing based solely on
the fact that the offender was convicted of a sex offense. Id.
9. Caleb Durling, Never Going Home: Does it Make Us Safer? Does it Make Sense? Sex
Offenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk Management Law, 97 J. CRiM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 317, 321-325 (2006); Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-
Incarceration Sanctions: Are There Any Limits?, 24 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 17, 42-43 (2008).
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offender's location.o Other jurisdictions allow for civil commitment of
sex offenders following their release from prison as a collateral conse-
quence of an offender's conviction for a sexually-based crime." Some
victims' rights advocates even suggest chemical castration as a means of
eliminating any future sexual arousal in convicted sex offenders, deviant
or otherwise.12
States continue to look for new ways to control this population
once they are released from prison. The most alarming of these new
techniques are "no contact" restrictions, which prevent paroled sex of-
fenders from having any interaction with persons under the age of
seventeen, including their own children." These "no contact" conditions
represent a drastic new step towards more restrictive parole that cannot
be justified on public safety grounds." "No contact" parole restrictions
test the constitutional limits of society's willingness to continue punish-
ing sex offenders long after their release from confinement.
Some sex offenders may need close monitoring and restrictions on
their parole before fully reintegrating into society. However, recidivism
studies regarding sex offenders are highly contested and overall do not
suggest any clear results. Some studies suggest that most sexual offenders
do not recidivate over time." Other research demonstrates that sex of-
fenders are no more likely to recidivate than other criminal offenders.
So why should we categorically prohibit these individuals from reunit-
ing with their families upon release from prison? The answer is that we
should not, so long as there are alternatives to "no contact" restrictions
that would still keep children safe."
10. Wright, supra note 9, at 36.
11. Wright, supra note 9, at 40.
12. Wright, supra note 11, at 46-47.
13. See infra Part III.
14. Id.
15. Timothy Fortney, Jill Levenson, Yolanda Brannon & Juanita N. Baker, Myths and
Facts About Sexual Offenders: Implications for Treatment and Public Policy, 2 SEXUAL
OFFENDER TREATMENT, no. 1, 2007, available at http://www.sexual-offender-
treatment.org/55.html; Patrick A. Langan, Erica L. Schmitt & Matthew R. Durose,
Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released fom Prison in 1994, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Bu-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcs 1, 24 (Nov. 2003), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
rsorp94.pdf (stating that within first three years of their release from prison, only
5.3% of former sex offenders committed a new sex offense).
16. See infra Part III (A)(2); Bynum et al., supra note 4. For a list of various recidivism
studies of sex offenders, pointing out that "data is scarce, complicated, and frequently
conflicting," see Bret Hobson, Note: Banishing Acts: How Far May States Go to Keep
Convicted Sex Offenders Away from Children? 40 GA. L. REV. 961, 969 (2006).
17. See infra Part V.
488 [Vol. 18:485
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The problem of states moving towards more restrictive conditions
is a problem of categorical over-inclusion. Highly restrictive parole con-
ditions may be necessary for some offenders (certainly for the Jesse
Timmendequas of the world), but they are not necessary for all. This
Article aims to expand current sex offender scholarship, focusing on the
new "no contact" restrictions and the way in which the application of
such restrictions to all sex offenders without individual review is not
only unconstitutional, but also poor public policy.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses current sex of-
fender restrictions and explains the state of the law by providing
examples of ways in which legislators have and continue to move to-
wards more restrictive parole for sex offenders. Specifically, Part I
addresses the unforeseen consequences of residency restrictions and the
extreme solution of civilly committing paroled sex offenders against
their will for indeterminate periods of time. Part II presents Michigan as
an alarming example of a state that uses "no contact" restrictions in con-
travention of the Constitution and in counterproductive ways,
potentially increasing recidivism in the state. Part III addresses the com-
plex constitutional questions created by the "no contact" conditions that
keep paroled offenders away from their children, and why such re-
strictions are not justifiable on public safety grounds. Finally, Part IV
suggests ways in which states can meet their public safety goals without
sacrificing parolees' constitutional rights.
I. WHERE WE ARE NOW AND How WE GOT THERE: EXAMPLES OF
THE CURRENT STATE OF SEX OFFENDER RESTRICTIONS
The common public perception is that removing former offenders"
from any potential interaction with minors-including their own chil-
dren, whether or not the children were involved in the offense of
conviction-is necessary to eliminate such individuals' opportunities to
abuse again." Proponents of such aggressive controls for released sex
18 I will use the term "former offender" to signify individuals who have been convicted
of or plead guilty to sex offenses in the past and who have since completed their sen-
tences and have been released from prison or jail.
19. See, e.g., Exploring Public Awareness and Attitudes About Sex Offender Management: Find-
ings from a National Public Opinion Poll, CTR. FOR SEx OFFENDER MGMT. 1, 5 (Aug.
2010), http://www.csom.org/pubs/CSOM-Exploring/20Public%20Awareness.pdf
[hereinafter Exploring Public Awareness] (noting that the results of a recent public
opinion poll indicated that "72% of respondents [believed] at least half, if not most,
convicted sex offenders will commit additional sex crimes in the future" and that
2012] 489
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offenders argue that sexual victimization of children can have devastat-
ing, long-term consequences for the victim and his or her family,
including mental health issues, reproductive difficulties, poor academic
performance, and more.20 Because of these severe consequences for vic-
tims, public opinion polls indicate support for state departments of
corrections that develop effective prevention measures to stop such
abuse before it begins.2'
This wisdom is misguided and can lead to drastic consequences.
The research on recidivism of sex offenders is inconclusive but suggests
that sex offenders are no more likely to recidivate than other criminals.22
Despite this research, legislators continue to rely on society's fear of sex
offenses and the consequences of such crimes. This fear often drives the
formulation and codification of harsh parole restrictions. This Part will
look briefly at why our fears about sex offenders may be unfounded, and
where such fear has taken us in restricting the liberty of sex offenders.
A. Inconclusive Research
Implicit in such post-incarceration restrictions of former sex of-
fenders is the view that the propensity to re-offend is high. Although the
public image of a sex offender may be uniform, a wide range of crimes
may make one a "sex offender." 23 This is what makes restrictive parole
conditions-especially "no contact" parole conditions-particularly
troublesome. First, these conditions are applied not only to those who
committed sex offenses against children, but also to those who commit-
ted sex offenses against adults and to those who committed a non-sexual
many respondents believed residency restrictions and registration requirements are ef-
fective ways of preventing recidivism).
20. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Schilling, Robert H. Aseltine, Jr. & Susan Gore, Adverse Child-
hood Experiences and Mental Health in Young Adults: A Longitudinal Study, 7 BMC
Pun. HEALTH 30 (2007) (arguing that there is a "very strong association between
childhood adversity and depressive symptoms, antisocial behavior, and drug use dur-
ing the early transition to adulthood"); Maria Trent, Gretchen Clum & Kathleen M.
Roch, Sexual Victimization and Reproductive Health Outcomes in Urban Youth, 7
ACAD. PEDIATRICS 313 (July 2007) (demonstrating that urban youth with history of
sexual victimization are "more likely than those without victimization histories to
have a pregnancy or STI [sexually transmitted infection] before young adulthood").
21. See generally Exploring Public Awareness, supra note 19, at 4-5.
22. See generally Bynum et al., supra note 4.
23. See Bynum et al., supra note 4, at 2 ("Sex offenders are a highly heterogeneous mix-
ture of individuals who have committed violent sexual assaults on strangers, offenders
who have had inappropriate sexual contact with family members, individuals who
have molested children, and those who have engaged in a wide range of other inap-
propriate and criminal sexual behaviors.").
[Vol. 18:485490
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crime against a child (e.g., involuntary manslaughter via drunk driving
that results in the death of a child passenger). Not all individuals who
committed sexual crimes are the sort of sexually aggressive, predatory
people society typically envisions as "sex offenders."2 4 Many are individ-
uals who were engaged in relationships that were consensual to the
couple, but illegal to the state-for example, "Romeo and Juliet" of-
fenders who were in relationships with their "victims" when their
"victims" happened to be months shy of the age of consent. 2  Others
committed one-time crimes of opportunity, and after treatment in con-
finement, are unlikely to threaten the safety of others.26
Recidivism rates for sex offenders are similarly heterogeneous.27
Although many sex crimes go unreported due to victims' feelings of fear,
humiliation, and guilt,28 recidivism studies of sex offenders do not indi-
cate that sex offenders are any more likely to re-offend than other types
of criminal offenders." Methodologies used to predict who will re-
offend are also far from perfect.30 The psychopathology of pedophilia
and sexually violent tendencies is incredibly complex." As a result, some
24. See generally Bynum et al., supra note 4, at 2.
25. Many states have statutory rape laws that criminalize sexual activity between a legal
adult and a person under the age of consent. These laws vary from state to state. In
some cases, activity charged as statutory rape is non-consensual and even predatory.
Other cases involve high school couples where only one partner is over the age of
consent. A couple's activity may be consensual, but is nonetheless criminalized by the
state. Once convicted, the adult partner is considered a sex offender. See JOSHUA
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAw (2009).
26. See generally Bynum et al., supra note 4.
27. Bynum et al., supra note 4, at 6 ("There is wide variation in results [in recidivism
rates], in both the amount of measured recidivism and the factors associated with the-
se outcomes.").
28. Bynum et al., supra note 4, at 3 (noting that factors leading to low reporting levels
"are compounded by the shame and guilt experienced by sexual assault victims, and,
for many, a desire to put a tragic experience behind them").
29. See generally Bynum et al., supra note 4.
30. Nora V. Demleitner, Risk Assessment: Promises and Pitfalls, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 161,
164 (2004) (noting that the methodologies for labeling offenders a "future threat ...
remain fallible").
31. Lisa J. Cohen & Igor Galynker, Psychopathology and Personality Traits ofPedopbiles: [ssues
for Diagnosis and Treatment, 6 PsYcHIATRIC TIMEs 25 (2009), available at
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/displaylarticle/10168/1420331. Cohen and Galynker
note that although there are some standard criteria to look for when diagnosing pe-
dophilia under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, there are two problems that may
make diagnosis and analysis difficult:
For one, convicted or arrested sex offenders might differ considerably from
pedophilic individuals who have not acted on their urges or who have acted
on them but have not been caught. Second, not everyone who sexually
2012] 491
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offenders remain a risk to their families long after their term of incarcer-
ation is complete, particularly in cases where the offender's own child
was the victim of the offense.
Despite the differences in risk factors and the inconclusive results of
recidivism studies, the criminal justice system increasingly treats all sex
offenders alike, without any regard for the individual danger a particular
offender may pose. Such undifferentiated treatment has serious proce-
dural and substantive due process implications, as these restrictions
impose on individuals' abilities to communicate with their families, find
affordable and sustainable housing, and otherwise lead productive and
meaningful lives outside of prison.32
B. Where We Are Now
In the last twenty years, restrictions on paroled sex offenders have
changed significantly. Federal legislation in the early 1990s required
former sex offenders to register their home addresses with the state,
marking the beginning of an increase in legislative efforts to separate sex
offenders from the rest of society." The overwhelming majority of states
enacted registration requirements for sex offenders, many in response to
the fact that Congress passed legislation that made ten percent of federal
law enforcement funding for the state contingent on the state having an
acceptable sex offender registration law."
In addition to registration requirements, many states have gone a
step further, limiting the locations in which such offenders may live
molests a child is actually a pedophile; that is, such a person may not have
a persistent sexual attraction to prepubescent children.
Id. at 25. See also Thomas A. Widiger & Lee Anna Clark, Toward DSM-V and the
Classification of Psychopathology, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 946, 949-50 (2001) (arguing
that the DSM does not provide adequate guidance for determining when sexual fan-
tasies regarding children or acting out such fantasies constitutes a mental disorder,
thereby complicating diagnosis and treatment).
32. Kurt Bumby et al., Managing the Challenges of Sex Offender Reentry, CTR. FOR SEX
OFFENDER MGMT. 1, 1(Feb. 2007), http://www.csom.org/pubs/reentrybrief.pdf
[hereinafter Bumby et al., Managing the Challenges] (noting challenges to reentry
faced by paroled sex offenders caused by "the proliferation of legislation that specifi-
cally targets the sex offender population").
33. See Durling, supra note 9, at 321 ("Megan's Laws, also known as Sex Offender Regis-
tration Acts (SORAs), require offenders to register promptly when they are released
from prison, and also mandate that sex offenders convicted in the past now register
themselves with their local police department.").
34. See Durling, supra note 9, at 321.
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once they are released.3 ' For instance, The Julia Tuttle Causeway
("Causeway") in Miami-Dade County, Florida, is a section of 1-195, a
well-traveled interstate that runs through southern Florida and connects
the mainland to parts of Miami Beach. From 2006 to 2010, it was also
home for the vast majority of sex offenders living in the County, none of
whom could find more suitable or permanent housing within Miami
proper.16 A shantytown developed under the Causeway as a result of a
new series of state and local statutes prohibiting convicted sex offenders
from living within 1,000 feet of a school zone, park, or playground, as
well as other sites where children are often present." Miami-Dade Coun-
tys local legislation took the state's requirements one step further,
preventing sex offenders from living within certain distances of school bus
stops, among other locations. Together, these legislative measures effec-
tively cut off all housing options for sex offenders." To avoid violating
their parole or probation conditions (and thus being sent back into Flori-
da prisons), a group of sex offenders set up a shantytown community
under the bridge.40 After months of living in makeshift housing, enduring
low overnight temperatures and unsanitary conditions, state legislators
finally began paying attention when the American Civil Liberties Union
of Florida sued on behalf of the Causeway residents.' Although the dis-
trict court dismissed the ACLU's case,42 local lawmakers (perhaps
because of the bad press the Causeway situation generated) agreed to
35. See Durling, supra note 9, at 322-23 (discussing the measures taken by different local
and state officials to restrict where sex offenders may live). As of 2006, thirteen states
had enacted residency restrictions, creating buffer zones around parks, schools, day-
cares, and other places where children may congregate. Id. at 322.
36. Greg Allen, Sex Offenders Forced to Live Under Miami Bridge, NAT'L PUB. RADIO,
May 20, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=104150499;
Damien Cave, Roadside Camp for Miami Sex Offenders Leads to Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/us/10offender.html; Catharine
Skipp, A Lawfor the Sex Offenders Under a Miami Bridge, TIME MAG., Feb. 1, 2010,
http://www.time.com/timelnation/article/0,8599,1 957778,00.html.
37. Skipp, supra note 36.
38. Skipp, supra note 36.
39. Skipp, supra note 36.
40. Skipp, supra note 36.
41. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Challenges Miami-Dade
County's 2,500 Foot Sex Offender Residency Restriction (July 9, 2009), available at
http://www.aclufl.org/news-events/?action=viewRelease&emailAlertlD=3760.
42. Kyle Muzenrieder, ACLU Lawsuit Dismissed, Sex Offenders Still Stuck Under
Bridge, MIAs NEW TIMES BLOG (Sept. 17, 2009, 2:19 PM), http://blogs
.miaminewtimes.com/riptide/2009/09/aclulawsuit-dismissed sex..off.php.
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reform the residency restrictions via county ordinance.43 With the
ACLU's appeal still pending, it is unclear whether and when more per-
manent changes to the county's laws will be enacted.44
Another issue facing sex offenders released from prison is the rise of
involuntary, post-incarceration civil commitment statutes. Following the
adoption of state involuntary commitment statutes in 1990, sex offend-
ers in Washington State are now subject to post-incarceration placement
on a "sex offender island" off the state's coast, aimed at treatment and
containment of what the state calls its "most dangerous sex offenders."45
McNeil Island, a small island nestled between Olympic National Park
and Tacoma, is home to the Special Commitment Center ("SCC"), a
maximum-security civil commitment facility for convicted sex offend-
ers.46  Individuals determined to be "sexually violent predators,"
("SVPs"), may be committed to the SCC following a term of impris-
onment if a judge concludes that the offender "[was] convicted of or
charged with a crime of sexual violence; and . .. suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to
engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure
facility."
Once committed to the SCC, an individual may remain there in-
definitely, until the State determines he or she is no longer a threat to
the public.4 The State Attorney General, a frequent advocate for civil
commitment following prison terms, reports that roughly 220 individu-
als are currently housed on McNeil Island.4 ' The program is touted as a
"management" and "treatment" program for those most at-risk of re-
offending."o
Following Washington State's lead, a number of other states have
adopted similar SVP laws to involuntarily hold sex offenders and pre-
43. Julie Brown, Miami-Dade OK's New Sex Offender Law, Muis HERALD, Jan. 22,
2010, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/state/miami-dade-oks-new-sex-offender-
law-190870.html.
44. See, e.g., Julie Brown, Sex Offender Camp Beneath Julia Tuttle Causeway Finally Being
Dismantled, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 27, 2010, available at http://www.sdpl23a.com/
index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=826&Itemid=31.
45. Sexually Violent Predators, WASH. STATE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN. (Mar. 13,
2011), http://www.atg.wa.gov/SVP/default.aspx.
46. The Special Commitment Center Program, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL & HEALTH
SERVICES (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.dshs.wa.gov/SCC/default.shtml. Offenders
may be sent directly to the SCC in lieu of a sentence, or may be involuntarily com-
mitted there upon release from prison. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
494 [Vol. 18:485
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vent them from re-entering society at the end of their prison terms." As
of December 2004, 3,493 people had been held for evaluation as an
SVP in seventeen states.52 The operation costs for SVP programs vary
from state to state, but have been reported to cost some states over
$100,000 per year per offender." In May 2010, the United States Su-
preme Court ruled that a federal law mandating civil commitment for
sex offenders beyond their criminal sentences is constitutional, paving
the way for such legislation in all fifty states."
II. THE CASE IN MICHIGAN
As states continue to implement these new methods of controlling
the sex offender population, one cannot help but wonder what types of
restrictions will come next. One of the more alarming examples of the
movement towards more restrictive parole conditions comes from Mich-
igan. There, the Parole Board's alleged current practice mandates the
automatic imposition of special parole conditions for all sex offenders
that prevent those offenders from having any contact with their minor
children for all or part of their parole-even if the offense of conviction
did not involve a minor." This practice was recently challenged by a
group of advocates who wanted the courts to recognize that the Consti-
tution must restrict how far parole conditions may go in curtailing
parolees' liberty rights.
In the spring of 2009, the Michigan Clinical Law Program at the
University of Michigan Law School along with the ACLU of Michigan
and Legal Aid of Western Michigan filed suit against members of the
Michigan State Parole Board. 7 This suit, Houle v. Sampson, challenged
on Due Process and First Amendment grounds the alleged automatic
imposition of certain "special conditions of parole" on any individual
51. Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators: Comparing State Laws, WASH.
STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/05-
03-1101.pdf.
52. Id. at 1-5.
53. Id. at 6. The highest annual cost per offender, reported in 2004, was in Minnesota at
$109,000. Id As a comparison, in 2009, the annual cost per inmate in the Minneso-
ta Department of Corrections was only $32,573. See Statistics for the State of
Minnesota, NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONs, http://nicic.gov/StateStats (last visited
Sept. 15, 2011).
54. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1949 (2010).
55. First Amended Complaint, Houle v. Sampson, No. 2:09-cv-10504 (E.D. Mich. Aug.
5, 2009).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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convicted of either a sexual offense or an offense with a child victim.
The two named plaintiffs were former Michigan Department of Correc-
tions (MDOC) prisoners, released with parole conditions that prevented
them from speaking with, much less seeing, their own children, as well
as attending public activities, such as church services, in places where
children may be present." These conditions were motivated by public
safety rationale.o Yet, as the plaintiffs argued, not every former prisoner
truly needed these conditions, and the conditions did not meaningfully
enhance public safety."
The challenged parole conditions, hereinafter referred to as "no
contact" restrictions, primarily prohibited individuals from (1) having
any sort of contact with any person under the age of seventeen,
(2) living in a residence where any person under the age of seventeen
resided, and (3) having a romantic relationship with a parent of minor
62
children. These parole conditions were allegedly imposed without any
review of the parolee's individual case, family situation, or progress in
therapy, and without notice or an opportunity to be heard.63
The automatic imposition of such conditions has devastating con-
sequences for parolees and their families and makes little sense for many
offenders. For example, one offender, "S,,64 was arrested at the age of 18
for having a consensual sexual relationship with his girlfriend, who at
58. See id.
59. Id. T 66-78.
60. See Defendants' Supplemental Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary In-
junction at 2-3, Houle v. Sampson, No. 2:09-cv-1050
4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 2009).
61. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, 11 66-78.
62. First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, 156 ("Special Condition 1.0 provides:
'You must not have any verbal, written, electronic or physical contact with any indi-
vidual age 17 or under, or attempt to do so, either directly or through another
person.' "); id. 1 59 ("Special Condition 1.1 provides: 'You must not live in a resi-
dence where any individual age 17 or under stays or is cared for. You must not
provide care for any individual age 17 or under.' "); id 1 60 ("Special Condition 1.3
provides: 'You must not marry, date, or have any romantic involvement with anyone
who resides with or has physical custody of any individual age 17 or under, without
getting written permission from the field agent.' ").
63. See Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 1, Houle v.
Sampson, No. 2:09-cv-1050 4 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2009).
64. These stories are taken from cases handled by the Michigan Clinical Law Program
during the fall of 2010. The author was a student attorney in the clinic and handled
intake for these cases. None of the examples used in this Article were named plaintiffs
in the Houle suit; their stories come from intake calls at the Clinic in the wake of the
dismissal of the Houle suit, and the Clinic's temporary system set up to handle such
cases. Information taken from intake interview questionnaires is confidential under
attorney-client privilege and not available for public distribution. Approval was given
to use these stories for the purposes of this Article, but any identifying information
has been removed to protect the privacy and confidentiality of the clients.
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the time of arrest was one month shy of sixteen, the age of consent in
Michigan, making their relationship statutory rape." S's girlfriend,
pregnant with their first child, wrote a victim impact statement to the
court stating that she was not a victim to any crime-that the only vic-
tim of criminalizing their relationship would be their unborn child. Due
in part to this statement, S was originally given probation, with no re-
strictions on his ability to see his girlfriend. After S's sentencing, his
girlfriend was over the age of consent. The couple gave birth to a healthy
baby and went on to have another child together. It was only after
committing a technical probation violation that S was incarcerated. Yet,
when S was released from prison, he was given special parole conditions
that effectively cut him off from his family. S's girlfriend was forced to
raise their two children on her own, without emotional or financial
support from the children's father, despite the fact that S clearly did not
pose a threat to his family.
Another offender, "D", was incarcerated close to thirty years ago af-
ter being involved in a drunk driving accident that resulted in the death
of two children riding in another car. After serving twenty-five years for
two counts of involuntary manslaughter, D was released from prison
with special conditions on his parole that prevented him from having
any contact with anyone under the age of seventeen. These conditions
were automatically imposed because D's offense had "child victims," not
because of any empirically-based assessment of the risk D may pose to
minors. The conditions prevented him from continuing his relationship
with his grandchildren, all of whom had visited D while he was incar-
cerated. It also caused significant trouble for D when he was released, as
the restrictions prohibited him from living with two of his three grown
children, because they each had minor children living in their homes.
Stories like S's and D's were the focus of the Houle litigation, in
which plaintiffs argued that not all prior offenders are a danger to their
families or communities and that the automatic imposition of these
conditions preventing contact with family members violated the parol-
ees' constitutional rights.66 However, parole in Michigan is imposed for
a set period of years defined in the parole order, 6 and by the time the
65. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520d (West 2011).
66. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, 1 66 ("The Special Conditions prohib-
iting contact with minors are imposed by the defendants on virtually all parolees
whose underlying conviction involves a sex offense, regardless of whether that offense
involved children, regardless of whether that offense involved consensual sexual activ-
ity, and regardless of whether there is evidence to suggest that the parolee is likely to
harm children.").
67. Mica. Comp. LAws ANN. § 791.242(1) (West 2011).
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litigation worked its way through the courts, the named plaintiffs were
either released from their parole restrictions or the MDOC voluntarily
removed the conditions, thereby mooting their claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief." As a result, plaintiffs' counsel agreed to dismiss
the suit voluntarily in exchange for the MDOC's promise to engage in a
temporary ad-hoc remedy for wrongfully imposed conditions.
Since early 2010, the Michigan Clinical Law Program has received
and continues to process scores of letters from parolees seeking to chal-
lenge the special conditions of their parole. Not all offenders subjected
to the special conditions had straightforward cases like S, D, and the
named plaintiffs in the Houle case. There were many cases where re-
strictions seemed appropriate, at least initially. Yet, it was impossible for
clinical students to determine who needed more restrictive parole based
on an offender's offense category or conviction alone. Instead, clinical
students reviewed much more paperwork, including therapy progress
reports and the arresting officer reports, and interviewed the legal guard-
ians of the offender's children (often the mothers of the children). Based
on this information, clinical students assessed the parolee's claim, and
then wrote letters advocating for change to regional parole supervisors.
This system of post hoc review was never perfect, nor was it in-
tended to be a long-term solution. Parolees would wait months to hear
back after clinical students sent letters on their behalf. Holidays passed
without family reunification. Parolees were forced to adjust to life with-
out any family support or community connections. Decisions by the
parole supervisor to change parole conditions were still made somewhat
arbitrarily, despite the strength of many letters submitted by the clinic.
And, although the MDOC always expressed interest in more compre-
hensive reform of the parole system in Michigan, that change was slow
in coming and did not seem to be a high priority for MDOC and pa-
role board administrators.
As legislators become more willing to impose ever-more restrictive
conditions on this subclass of former prisoners, advocates fear that states
might go too far." Although there are a plethora of academic articles on
68. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 2, Houle
v. Sampson, No. 2.09-cv-10504 (E.D. Mich. April 3, 2009).
69. See, e.g., Corey Kilgannon, Woman With a Mission: Keeping Tabs on Sex Offenders,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/nyregion/
08sex.html. In 2008, a $593,000 federal grant was given to a non-profit group, Par-
ents for Megan's Law and the Crime Victims' Center, dedicated to developing
advanced mapping techniques so community members can identify and track sex of-
fenders; one US Senator and three US Representatives even joined at the grant-giving
ceremony. Id. Lawmakers worked with the founder of Parents for Megan's Law and
the Crime Victims' Center to pass more restrictive federal legislation, including the
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those types of restrictions," little has been written about other parole
conditions like the familial restrictions imposed in Michigan. Despite
frequent criticism of residency and registration requirements on the
grounds that such increased restrictions on paroled sex offenders violate
their constitutional rights, many states are in step with Michigan, con-
tinuing to move towards more restrictive parole conditions.7 1 It is
important, therefore, to determine the point at which the constitutional
rights of parolees are violated, to alert legislators to the fact that addi-
tional restrictions on parole may very well go too far.
111. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE AGAINST
No CONTACT RESTRICTIONS
"No contact" restrictions go beyond previously upheld residency
and registration restrictions and are unconstitutional.
It is easy to understand why legislators continue to churn out more
restrictive parole conditions. As elected officials, they have a desire to
prevent or deter future crimes, improve public safety, and keep their
constituents at ease. This trend continues when parolees attempt to vin-
dicate their rights in court. In challenges to parole conditions, judges
typically defer to the legislature's reasoning or avoid ruling on the con-
stitutionality of restrictions at all.7 2 So far the United States Supreme
Court has been reluctant to strike down most restrictions, including
registration and notification requirements, "safe zone" legislation, and
GPS monitoring programs.' However, there has not been a challenge in
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. Id. "Critics call [the founder's] zealous
pursuit of sex offenders counterproductive and unconstitutional, and contend that
overexposure can deter the offenders from checking in with the authorities." Id.
70. See, e.g., Durling, supra note 9; Hobson, supra note 16; Meghan S. Towers, Protec-
tionism, Punishment and Pariabs: Sex Offenders and Residence Restrictions, 15 J.L. &
POL'Y 291 (2007).
71. Kurt Bumby et al., Legislative Trends in Sex Offender Management, CENTER FOR SEX
OFFENDER MANAGEMENT 1, 2 (Nov. 2008), http://www.csom.org/pubs/legislative
trends.pdf ("Lawmakers nationwide have responded by proposing and enacting sex
offender-specific legislation at an unprecedented level over the past few years. These
laws include, but are not limited to, civil commitment, mandatory minimum sen-
tences, expanded registration and community notification requirements, and
proximity laws such as residency restrictions. In fact, sex offender management policy
remains among the principal topics facing legislative bodies nationwide, alongside is-
sues such as immigration, engy, environmental protection, and healthcare.").
72. See Hobson, supra note 16, at 966.
73. Hobson, supra note 16, at 967. Current and former parolees have also challenged
residency restriction statutes, which create "buffer zones" around schools, play-
grounds, and daycare facilities, where paroled sex offenders cannot live. For a
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the higher courts to conditions that implicate the fundamental right of a
parolee to maintain a relationship with his or her children.
The Houle litigation was premised primarily on two discrete consti-
tutional claims: violation of the plaintiffs' "fundamental right to
maintain relationships with their children"" and of their "fundamental
right to marry and maintain personal relationships."" Although the
court never reached a decision on the merits of the case, there is a strong
argument that Michigan's and other states' restrictions infringing on
familial relationships are unconstitutional on both substantive and pro-
cedural due process grounds.
This Part reviews the constitutional arguments against "no contact"
parole restrictions. Section A addresses the substantive due process rights
implicated by such restrictions, arguing that the right to be involved in the
life of one's child is a fundamental right deserving strict scrutiny
review, and that the restrictions are not narrowly tailored to meet a com-
pelling government interest. Section A also argues that the "no contact"
restrictions do not advance any such compelling government interest, and
may actually threaten rather than enhance public safety. Section B turns to
the procedural due process argument that the automatic coupling of "no
contact" restrictions with certain offenses deprives parolees of notice and
an opportunity to be heard.
A. The Fundamental Right: No Contact Restrictions and
Their Substantive Due Process Implications
Substantive Due Process claims are premised on the idea that "the
Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and lib-
erties which are objectively 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition.' " Claims of substantive due process violations must contain
comprehensive review of state statutes creating such zones, see Hobson, supra note 16,
at 970 n.54. For examples of challenges to such statutes, see id. at 971-72 n.55-65.
These challenges were not successful in striking down the statutes, but support for re-
form of the statutes exists in dissenting opinions. Id. at 971.
74. First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, 179.
75. Id. I 83. The Houle litigation also addressed the First Amendment right to practice
religion, as the special parole conditions also prohibited parolees from attending
church or other religious services, because children were likely to be present at houses
of worship. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, T 87-90. Although that
claim presents interesting constitutional challenges in and of itself, this Article focuses
on the parental rights of parolees and will not address the religious freedom implica-
tions of the MDOC parole conditions.
76. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
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a "careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest."" Yet,
in challenges to sex offender laws mandating registration, residency re-
strictions, or other limitations on parole, offenders are often unable to
"articulate a specific, cognizable liberty interest" affected by the legisla-
tion." The Constitution does not guarantee a right to live in a particular
house or hold a particular job. In contrast, "no contact" conditions, such
as those imposed in Michigan, infringe on an articulable, judicially rec-
ognized liberty interest: the "fundamental right to maintain a
relationship with [one's] children."" Therefore, courts should subject
such conditions to strict scrutiny review.
The Supreme Court consistently recognizes that the right of par-
ents to "make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
their children" is a fundamental right.o In fact, "it is well-established
[by Supreme Court and lower court precedent] that a parent's interest
in maintaining a relationship with his or her child is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.""s Moreover, the
Court notes that "family life, and the upbringing of children, are
among associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic im-
portance to our society, rights sheltered against the State's unwarranted
usurpation, disregard, or disrespect."8 2 Although this right is not abso-
lute,"' absent evidence that the parent poses a threat to his child, the
Court is careful not to infringe on the rights of parents to raise their
children, especially when the parent has been actively involved in his
77. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
78. Hobson, supra note 16, at 972. For an example of one such decision, see Doe v.
Moore, 410 F.3d 1337 (11th Cit. 2005). There, the court denied relief for the plain-
tiffs on their substantive due process claim because the plaintiffs were unable to
articulate a "careful description" of a particular right protected by the Due Process
Clause that was infringed upon by the sex offender registration statute. Although
couched in terms of the right to associate with one's family, the plaintiffs were essen-
tially claiming a right to be free from the burdens of a sex offender registry, which is
not a right "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition." Doe v. Moore, 410
F.3d at 1344-45.
79. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 63, at 3.
80. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (noting that such an interest is "per-
haps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court").
81. U.S. v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir. 2005).
82. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 376 (1971)).
83. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 104 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Although parents
enjoy a constitutionally protected interest in their family integrity, this interest is
counterbalanced by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of minor
children, particularly in circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as
against the parents themselves." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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child's life up until the point of incarceration. Government intru-
sions into family relationships must be narrowly tailored to the interest
the intrusion attempts to protect."5
Even though parolees have had limited success in challenging their
parole conditions on substantive due process grounds, holdings from
prior cases leave room to challenge the more restrictive "no contact"
rules. In one line of cases in Iowa, paroled sex offenders "argued that
residency restrictions infringe upon their fundamental rights by interfer-
ing with their ability to reside with family members that live within
exclusionary zones."" In Doe v. Miller (Miller II), for example, the
Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding that such restrictions
violated the fundamental right to live with family members, primarily
because "the laws [did] not directly specify with whom the offender can
live, but rather merely indicate[d] where the offender can live."87 In con-
trast to residency restrictions, "no contact" rules prevent parolees from
having any contact with their minor children-much less living with
them under the same roof."
The implication of the Eighth Circuit's holding in Miller II is that
laws that directly prevent offenders from living with their families-
rather than just restricting where the family unit may live-may violate
substantive due process. The Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court
previously held strict scrutiny should not apply when a statute's effect on
the family relationship is merely incidental or unintended." This dis-
tinction suggests that when a statute directly affects a family
relationship, a heightened review of the purpose behind the statute is
triggered, to ensure that it is neither overbroad nor overly burdensome
84. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (holding that where the bio-
logical father has not "demonstrate[d] a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child," the father
may not have as strong of a Due Process right to a relationship with his child) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
85. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (noting that the government cannot
intrude on a fundamental liberty interest "unless the infringement is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest").
86. Hobson, supra note 16, at 974.
87. Hobson, supra note 16, at 974 (citing Doe v. Miller (Miller Il), 405 F.3d 700, 710-
11 (8th Cit. 2005), cert. denied, No. 05-428, 2005 WL 3144173 (Nov. 28, 2005));
see also Doe v. Petro, No. 1:05-CV-125, 2005 WL 1038846, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May
3, 2005) ("[The statute] does not prevent persons subject to its restrictions from liv-
ing with their families, it only regulates where they may live. Plaintiffs are free to live
with their families in non-restricted areas.").
88. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 55.
89. Miller II, 405 F.3d at 710; see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
498-99 (1977).
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for the individuals targeted by its terms.o Yet, unlike residency re-
strictions, under which families may move to locations that are not
within "buffer zones" of schools, playgrounds, parks, or other prohibited
locations, statutes prohibiting inmates from seeing their families clearly
impact the family relationship directly and intentionally.
Once a plaintiff makes out a claim of intrusion into a fundamental-
ly protected right, and strict scrutiny analysis is triggered, the intrusion
is upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling government in-
terest." Few would argue that such restrictions fail to serve a legitimate
and compelling purpose, if the restrictions actually serve their intended
goal-keeping communities and children safe, and preventing recidi-
vism. The question regarding "no contact" parole conditions, therefore,
is twofold: (1) whether or not the effect is overbroad, and (2) whether or
not that goal is served.92
1. Unreasonable and Unjustified: Why the Public
Safety Justification Is Inapplicable
Although "no contact" restrictions are typically justified from a
public safety perspective, research on recidivism and re-entry policies
suggests that such conditions may instead have a negative impact on
public safety.
Empirical studies suggest that strong support networks are among
the most effective means to combat recidivism." The few studies con-
ducted on the link between familial support and recidivism show a
positive relationship: strong family ties are correlated with lower recidi-
vism rates for reentering offenders." Other studies show that restrictive
parole supervision does not necessarily lead to lower re-offending rates.9
90. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997).
91. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21; see also Hobson, supra note , at 988 ("Alt-
hough many regulations in our society legitimately restrict citizens' liberty by limiting
where people may live and travel, at some point the magnitude of an interference
with a person's liberty becomes so severe that the interference must be justified by
more than a mere rational basis.").
92. See U.S. v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 126 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[When a fundamental liber-
ty interest is implicated by a sentencing condition, we must first consider the
sentencing goal to which the condition relates, and whether the record establishes its
reasonableness. We must then consider whether it represents a greater deprivation of
liberty than is necessary to achieve that goal.").
93. See, e.g., James Austin & Patricia L. Hardyman, The Risks and Needs of the Returning
Prisoner Population, 21 REV. OF POL Y REs. 13, 18 (2004).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 17.
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Offenders who are able to maintain relationships with their families
during incarceration tend to have a higher success rate once released." It
seems that the ability to continue this relationship once offenders return
to the community has a profound effect as well. Researchers agree that
"family support can make or break a successful transition from prison to
community," and that family members "providle] former inmates with
critical material and emotional support, including shelter, food, cloth-
ing, leads for jobs, and guidance in staying sober or avoiding criminal
behavior.", 7 Others note that "sex offenders . . need support systems
made up of people who will accept their potential for deviant behavior
... and empower them to engage in healthy, law-abiding, respectful re-
lationships and activities" and that "family members can play an
important role in this endeavor."" Even more compelling is one study's
finding that "the strongest predictor of individual success [for parolees]
was the perception by the person released that his family supported
him."9'
Apart from the impact such "no contact" restrictions may have on
the offenders themselves, the restrictions also profoundly affect the lives
of the offender's loved ones. Research shows that "invisible punishments
and their consequences (i.e. . . . obstacles to assuming adult and parental
roles) have a documented impact on families of criminal offenders."' 0
The invisible victims of "no contact" restrictions are the children of
former sex offenders, who are forced to spend two years apart from a
parent (at least in Michigan), and who may suffer developmental and
emotional harm as a result.'o' The negative impact of parole conditions
on the relationship between the offender and his or her children can also
"influence [the children's] own future criminal and non-criminal behav-
96. See, e.g., id. at 20 ("We know that the risk of recidivism for an ex-prisoner is related
to his or her ability to maintain healthy relationships with his or her spouse, children,
or parent(s) while incarcerated.").
97. Mike Bobbitt & Marta Nelson, The Front Line: Building Programs that Recognize
Families' Role in Reentry, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE 1 (Sept. 2004), http://
www.idvaac.org/medialpublications/249_476.pdf (last visited September 25, 2011).
98. Jill Levenson & Richard Tewksbury, Collateral Damage: Family Members ofRegistered
Sex Offenders, 34 AM. J. CRm. JUST. 54, 65 (2009).
99. Marta Nelson, Perry Deess, & Charlotte Allen, The First Month Out: Post-
Incarceration Experiences in New York City, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE 1, 10 (1999),
http://www.vera.org/download?file=219/first-month-out.pdf.
100. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 98, at 64 (citing PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED:
THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COM-
MUNITIES (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., Urban Institute Press 2003)).
101. See Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 98, at 65 ("What remains unclear is the myr-
iad of ways in which these experiences will impact [the children's] psychosocial
development, their interpersonal relationships, and their sense of self.").
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iors."102 Studies show that the incarceration of parents, and the resulting
separation of parents from their children, is "likely to perpetuate the
cycle of criminal behavior and incarceration in the family."'0 ' Therefore,
separating children from their parents may harm, rather than promote,
public safety.
Of course, this will not be the case for every parolee. As mentioned
earlier, there are some offenders who will not be ready to reunite with
their family immediately upon release, particularly in cases where the
offender's victim was his or her child or close family member.'o4 This
may also be the case where the victim was particularly young or the
crime was particularly heinous. However, these distinctions speak more
to the need for narrower tailoring of the parole conditions to the indi-
vidual parolees than to the need for blanket provisions for all offenders.
Without narrow tailoring, the conditions remain unconstitutional as
applied to the numerous parolees who do not need to be separated from
their children in order to keep the community safe. Further, such blan-
ket provisions may not make communities any safer.
In this way, individualized assessment of each offender to deter-
mine appropriate parole conditions is constitutionally necessary and will
better serve the goal of enhancing public safety. For many parolees, such
"no contact" restrictions will make little sense because, despite the fact
that restrictive parole conditions continue to be justified by claims of
increasing public safety and preventing future criminal activity, "no con-
tact" restrictions likely have the opposite effect. Cutting parolees off
from their families and communities in general does not enhance public
safety. Rather, it places parolees in situations where they are more likely
to re-offend and potentially causes great harm to the social and emo-
tional development of their children. In this way, the professed purpose
behind such restrictions is neither narrowly tailored nor serving a legit-
imate government purpose.
102. Levenson & Tewksbury, supra note 98, at 65.
103. Austin & Hardyman, supra note 93, at 21 (citing a study linking the incarceration of
mothers to future criminal behavior of their children). Although "it is more likely
that children will experience separation from a mother than separation from a father
[during incarceration]," incarceration of either parent, and further isolation of that
parent during the parole period, can have profound emotional and behavioral affects
on children. Rose D. Parke & K. Alison Clarke-Steward, The Effects ofParentalIncar-
ceration on Children: Perspectives, Promises, and Policies, in PRISONERS ONCE
REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES,
AND COMMUNITIES 189, 200 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., Urban Institute
Press 2003).
104. See supra Part I.
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2. What Is Good for One Is Not Always Good for All:
The Need for Narrow Tailoring
The Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
recognizes this limitation on the state's ability to punish convicted crim-
inals-punishment must not be arbitrary, capricious, or unconnected to
the crime.o' Under federal law, the court can impose a sentence that is
"sufficient, but not greater than necessary," to accomplish the purposes
of punishment.o6 In deciding what punishment is necessary, the court
may consider the nature and circumstances of the crime, the need to
deter future criminal activity, the need to protect the public, and the
best ways to rehabilitate the offender.'
Parole is structurally and statutorily different from criminal sen-
tencing, although the two are intrinsically intertwined. When it comes
to terms of supervised release following a prison sentence, however, ei-
ther through parole or probation, the court may only "impose special
conditions of supervised release that are [(1)] to certain statutory factors
governing sentencing, [(2)] 'involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary' to implement the statutory purposes of
sentencing, and [(3)] are consistent with pertinent Sentencing Commis-
sion policy statements." Moreover, courts often hold that
''associational parole conditions [conditions limiting the relationships
parolees may have with others] are valid only if the association would
undermine the parolee's rehabilitation or endanger public safety."'0o
When a restriction is "poorly designed" to accomplish the government's
"speculative goals," then the restriction is invalid from a constitutional
perspective because it is not narrowly tailored to a legitimate purpose.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2010).
108. United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d)).
109. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 63, at 6
(citing United States v. Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 559-60 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding a
restriction on defendant's contact with her fianc6 because the defendant's crime re-
sulted directly from that relationship)). But see United States v. Worthington, 145
F.3d 1335, at *18 (6th Cir. 1998) (striking down condition that prevented former
offender from living with unrelated female, because it was "unclear what relation the
condition bears to the nature and circumstances of the offense, rehabilitation of the
offender, or protecting the public.").
110. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 63, at 6
(citing Worthington, 145 F.3d at * 18).
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Although the issue of associational parole conditions has yet to
reach the U.S. Supreme Court, circuit courts have been reluctant to up-
hold parole conditions that seem too loosely tailored to the actual threat
posed by the former offender.'" In United States v. Davis, the Eighth
Circuit held that a parole condition prohibiting the defendant from
having unsupervised visitation with his minor daughter was unconstitu-
tional, even though the defendant was originally convicted on child
pornography charges.'' 2 The court determined that "[t]here [was] no
evidence in the record that [the defendant] has ever sexually abused a
child or that he would try to abuse his daughter once released from
prison," and therefore, the condition prohibiting visitation with his
daughter was impermissible."3 The court explicitly stated that, "the gov-
ernment may circumscribe [the parolee's relationship with his child]
only if it shows that the condition is no more restrictive that what is rea-
sonably necessary.""
The Second and Third Circuits have reached similar holdings."' In
United States v. Myers, a Second Circuit case, a parolee convicted of
child pornography challenged the "no contact" rule that prevented him
from seeing his son without first notifying his probation officer."' Myers
argued that the condition was unjustified because the offense of which
he was convicted did not involve his son, he had no history of harming
or threatening to harm his son, and other conditions of supervised re-
lease would address the court's concerns for public safety."'7 In support
of his claim, Myers argued that "limitations on [his] contact with his
son were a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary under
18 U.S.C. %5 3553(a) and 3583(d), and unconstitutionally interfered
with the parent child relationship in the absence of any evidence that
[he posed] a threat to his own child.""' The court then changed the "no
contact" restriction to allow Myers to visit his own son, provided that
the probation officer granted approval for each visit in advance."' Even
though he was allowed visits with his son, Myers appealed the
111. See, e.g., Myers, 426 F.3d at 123; Worthington, 145 F.3d at 18.
112. United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2006).
113. Davis, 452 F.3d at 995.
114. Davis, 452 F.3d at 995.
115. See, e.g., Myers, 426 F.3d at 120; United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139, 155 (3d
Cir. 2006); United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 270 (3d Cir. 2001). These cases are
also highlighted in the Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion, supra note 63, at 4.
116. Myers, 426 F.3d at 122.
117. Myers, 426 F.3d at 121.
118. Myers, 426 F.3d at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Myers, 426 F.3d at 122.
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condition, arguing that the approval requirement unconstitutionally
interfered with his parental rights absent any tangible evidence that My-
ers posed a threat to his son.120
Current Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, then sitting for
the Second Circuit, agreed. 21 Writing for the court, then-Judge So-
tomayor stated, "if the goal of the condition . . . was to protect Myers's
own son, the district court will need to develop a record demonstrating
the danger to that child, because we cannot say on the basis of the rec-
ord before us that such a danger has been demonstrated." 22 Because
"neither the offense of conviction nor the prior offense . .. involved
Myers's own child," and both of Myers's offenses involved girls, rather
than boys, the record did not support a condition limiting Myers's in-
teraction with his son.123  The case was remanded for further
examination, and Sotomayor noted that if the district court wished to
impose a special condition limiting contact between Myers and his son,
it must first decide:
(1) what the goal of the condition is; (2) if the goal is to pro-
tect Myers's own child, whether an adequate record can be
developed to support it; (3) whatever the goal of the condi-
tion, whether Myers has any constitutionally protected right to
a relationship with his child; and (4) what terms of the condi-
tion are necessary and not a greater deprivation of any
identified liberty interests than reasonable to achieve the sen-
tencing goal.124
The Myers opinion therefore supports the notion that, "even a pe-
dophile may not be deprived of contact with his child, absent an
individualized showing that the deprivation is narrowly tailored to meet
the legitimate goals of advancing rehabilitation or protecting that
child." 25
It is the "automatic" nature of the conditions that raises the most
serious constitutional concerns. For example, the MDOC allegedly im-
poses the "no contact" restriction on anyone convicted of a sexual crime
or a crime that involved a child victim, whether sexual in nature or
120. Myers, 426 F.3d at 122.
121. Myers, 426 F.3d at 127-28.
122. Myers, 426 F.3d at 127-28.
123. Myers, 426 F.3d at 128.
124. Myers, 426 F.3d at 130.
125. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 63, at 4.
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not. 12 A computer automatically links the restriction to the offender,
and little or no individual assessment is ever conducted. 127 The constitu-
tional problem with the restriction is not just the restriction itself-it is
also the imposition of the restriction without any review of its necessity
for the particular offender.
So how do we determine whether no contact parole conditions are
actually necessary to protect the children of convicted sex offenders? Pol-
iticians fear, perhaps rightfully so, that "if a single paroled lifer commits
a major crime and receives extensive media attention, the blame will
come back on them." 28 Yet, given the constitutional protections parents
are afforded when it comes to relationships with their children, political
fear should not be controlling.
Instead, to ensure "narrow tailoring" of the restriction to its pur-
pose, an individualized inquiry and risk assessment should be done
before "no contact" restrictions are imposed. Researchers acknowledge
that "behavior is influenced by a variety of internal and external factors
that can change over the life course."129 Moreover, while "all sexual of-
fending is, by definition, socially deviant . .. not all sexual offenders
have deviant sexual interests or preferences." 30 Granted, many sex of-
fenders continue to have deviant sexual interests after their period of
incarceration; they either do not respond positively to therapy, or they
are unable to cope with triggers in the community that create inappro-
priate arousal. Generalizing all sex offenders in this way, however, would
do a great injustice to all those who have reformed their behavior while
incarcerated and who are able to lead productive, law-abiding lives in
the community.
For example, a man convicted of Criminal Sexual Conduct in the
Fourth Degree under Michigan's criminal statute for grabbing a wom-
an's buttocks at a dance club is not comparable to a man who violently
rapes a stranger or repeatedly molests children. Yet, under the automatic
126. First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, 1 51-53.
127. First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, (J 51-53. However, the defendants in
the Houle litigation maintained that the computerized linking of offenses and spe-
cial conditions of parole was reviewed individually by the Parole Board member
conducting the parole interview. See Defendants' Supplemental Response to Plain-
tiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 60, at 2.
128. Austin & Hardyman, supra note 93, at 25.
129. R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussibr, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual
Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 348
(1998).
130. Id. at 349 (pointing out that some sexual offenders may have merely misperceived the
illegality of their actions, e.g. "date rapists," who believed "no means yes," or "statu-
tory rapists," who believed their victim was over the age of consent).
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coupling system used in Michigan, these two offenders are treated as an
equal risk to the safety of the public and equally deserving of restrictive
parole conditions.
Due to the variation in risk level among all those lumped into the
category of "sex offenders," clinicians and reviewing courts often argue
for a detailed review of the offender's sexual offense history, psycho-
logical adjustment, motivation to change, overall behavior, response to
sex offender therapy, and more.'3' Meta-analysis of risk factors for sex-
ual re-offending suggests that "static, historical" variables, such as
general criminality, sexual offense history, and stranger victims, in-
crease risk of recidivism.'32 These studies also consider "dynamic"
variables, including drug use and steady employment, and conclude
that identification of dynamic risk factors may be the key to appropri-
ate intervention and prevention.'" These studies, taken together,
suggest that risk for re-offending is highly individualized. Sex offend-
ers are not likely to recidivate just because they offended in the past;
rather, there are many other factors in play.
Although recidivism research on sex offenders is far from conclu-
sive, the Center for Sex Offender Management, an office established
through a partnership between the U.S. Department of Justice's Office
of Justice Programs, the American Parole and Probation Association, the
National Institute of Corrections, and the State Justice Institute, notes
that "only about 12-24% of sex offenders will re-offend .. . [and] when
sex offenders do commit another crime, it is more often not sexual or
violent."' Nevertheless, the majority of the population continues to
fear sex offenders.'35 Naturally, we are more afraid of the more serious
offenders, because instinct tells us that the seriousness of a crime means
the offender is less likely to be rehabilitated and more likely to re-
offend. Perhaps our fear is based on some general gut feeling that mur-
131. See, e.g., id.; see also United States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2006)
(holding that inquiries into the dangerousness of paroled offenders "must take place
on an individualized basis; a court may not impose a special condition on all those
found guilty of a particular offense").
132. R. Karl Hanson & David Thornton, Improving Risk Assessment for Sex Offenders: A
Comparison of Three Actuarial Scales, 24 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 120 (2000).
133. Bynum et al., supra note 4.
134. Fact Sheet: What You Need to Know About Sex Offenders, CENTER FOR SEx OFFENDER
MANAGEMENT 1, 3 (2008), http://www.csom.org/pubs/needtoknowfs.pdf.
135. See Exploring Public Awareness, supra note 19, at 3 (noting that in a recent study,
"well over half of [the] national sample (60%) believed that sex offenders who com-
mit new crimes are most likely to perpetrate another, similar sex offense. One third
(33%) were of the opinion that, if sex offenders recidivate, they are most likely to en-
gage in criminal conduct that is more serious and violent that [sic] their prior
offenses.").
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ders, armed robbers, or sex offenders have innate personality characteris-
tics that compel them to commit such heinous acts. Yet, research does
not support our assumptions.' Moreover, early studies show that crime
rates are much more related to community structures and support sys-
tems than the attributes of individual offenders.'3 7
Research continues to evolve. In the last ten years, treatment and
risk classification professionals turned to newly developed actuarial
models to predict risk of re-offending.'3 8 Although classification and risk
assessment instruments are far from perfect, empirical models are useful
tools for departments of corrections when determining the appropriate
parole conditions for any given offender.'39
No matter which risk assessment model is used, substantive due
process protections clearly mandate some sort of individualized assess-
ment to assure that the restrictions imposed are narrowly tailored to the
risk posed by each parolee. Although these individuals may have com-
mitted egregious crimes in the past, they still deserve constitutional
protection. "No contact" restrictions, which threaten an individual's
constitutional right to a relationship with his or her children, should not
be imposed on any offender unless the state can clearly demonstrate that
the restriction is necessary for that given offender.
B. The Opportunity To Be Heard: Procedural
Due Process Implications
Even if states move towards individualized assessment before im-
posing "no contact" restrictions, procedural due process guarantees
offenders notice and the opportunity to be heard before their funda-
mental right to parenting is restricted by the state.140
Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment is im-
plicated when offenders are deprived of a liberty interest without due
136. Exploring Public Awareness, supra note 19, at 3 ("These perceptions do not comport
with research that indicates that sex offenders are more apt to be rearrested or recon-
victed for non-sexual, non-violent crimes than for additional sex offenses.").
137. See generally ARNOLD S. L~sicY & MUUAY A. STRAUS, SocIAL STRESS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1986).
138. Id. at 120.
139. See Bynum et al., supra note 4, at 17 (concluding that empirical risk assessment tools
are useful for practitioners, but that more research is needed on the effects of "various
treatment approaches and community supervision.").
140. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard . . . and it is to this end, of course, that
summons or equivalent notice is employed.").
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process of law.'"' Either state or federal law can create liberty interests
subject to due process protections. 4 2 Regardless of the nature of the lib-
erty interest at stake, the Court has held that pre-deprivation process is
required when the deprivation is foreseeable or recurring.W And, when
pre-deprivation process is required, that process typically requires giving
the parolee notice of the deprivation and the opportunity to respond to
its justifications. 44
Offenders currently receive a list of their parole conditions prior to
release. 45 Presumably, this is enough to satisfy the "notice" requirement
of due process. At least in Michigan, however, offenders are not given
the opportunity to contest their conditions prior to release -a clear
violation of the due process requirement that offenders be given the op-
portunity to be heard prior to deprivations of fundamental rights.
Supreme Court precedent articulates the constitutional need for
pre-deprivation procedure in circumstances where the administrative
deprivation drastically changes an inmate's circumstances and places the
inmate at risk of unjustified harm.'47 In Vitek v. Jones, the Court held
that a Nebraska statute authorizing medical officials to transfer inmates
to mental hospitals without a hearing violated due process. The Court
determined that the mandatory treatment in the hospital, coupled with
the stigmatizing nature of being a mental institution, meant that such a
transfer "constituted a major change in the conditions of confinement
amounting to a 'grievous loss' that should not be imposed without the
opportunity for notice and an adequate hearing."4 1
The Fifth Circuit further interpreted Vitek in the context of special
conditions of parole for sex offenders. There, the court held that the
imposition of parole conditions that are atypical, significantly stigmatiz-
ing or harmful to the offender, and highly intrusive on the liberty
interests of the offender require proper procedures before such condi-
tions may be imposed.' The court determined that, as in Vitek,
mandatory sex offender therapy for a parolee, absent proof that such
141. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
142. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478-79 (1995).
143. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 132 (1990).
144. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) ("The fundamental re-
quirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard") (internal quotations
omitted); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1972).
145. See generally MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 791.236 (West 2011).
146. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 55, 1 54.
147. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980).
148. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488.
149. Viek, 445 U.S. at 488.
150. Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216, 222 (5th Cit. 2004)
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treatment was needed, was "qualitatively different from other conditions
which may attend an inmate's release."'' A strong argument exists that
the mandatory imposition of "no contact" restrictions, absent proof that
such restrictions are needed, also trigger procedural due process under
the Vitek reasoning. The fact that offenders are entitled and allowed to
see their children while incarcerated only lends further weight to the
argument that "no contact" rules are "qualitatively different" from the
types of restrictions inmates-much less parolees-typically face. As
articulated by the Houle plaintiffs, seeing one's family, maintaining per-
sonal relationships, and developing healthy ties to one's children are all
the normal elements of being on parole.'5 2 In fact, they are the types of
behaviors that parole is intended to facilitate.'"
Granted, requiring notice and an opportunity for parolees to be
heard will come at a cost to the state. Yet, cost savings alone is rarely a
justification for denial of procedural due process, especially when lack of
process threatens such a fundamental right as the right to have a rela-
tionship with one's children.' 5  Moreover, in the interest of protecting
fundamental rights of parolees, individualized review should be imple-
mented regardless of cost. As it is, regional parole supervisors and parole
board members must return to their old files, spending additional time
reviewing new letters from clinical students, speaking with supervisors,
and submitting paperwork to modify inappropriate or unnecessary con-
ditions. These modifications probably take more time, and thus more
money, away from state officers than an initial individualized review or
hearing, prior to the assignment of parole conditions, would require.
Thus, in the end, in addition to being unconstitutional, the "no con-
tact" restrictions also amount to an expensive waste of time and
resources for the state.
151. Coleman, 395 F.3d at 223.
152. Plaintiffs' Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 63, at
11.
153. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (noting that the purpose of pa-
role is to help offenders reintegrate into society and become productive members of
their community).
154. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) ("Financial cost alone is not a
controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a particular proce-
dural safeguard prior to some administrative decision . . . More is implicated in cases
of this type than ad hoc weighing [of costs and benefits] . . . The ultimate balance in-
volves a determination as to when, under our constitutional system, judicial-type
procedures must be imposed upon administrative action to assure fairness.").
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IV. RESTRICTIONS GOING FORWARD: ALTERNATIVES AIMED
AT INCREASING PUBLIC SAFETY WITHOUT
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS
As states continue to grapple with determining the best ways to
transition offenders from incarceration into society, legislators and state
departments of corrections should learn from the evaluation of restric-
tive parole conditions and the failures of other states. There are
alternatives to the automatic imposition of restrictive "no contact" con-
ditions-alternatives that are not only constitutional, but also could
help keep communities safe. These alternatives include individualized
assessment of parolees to determine the appropriate conditions; using a
baseline assumption that a parolee should have contact with his or her
children upon release, absent any evidence requiring otherwise; and us-
ing the safeguards in place when children visit their parents during
incarceration to ensure that visitation between parolees and their chil-
dren will not be harmful.
None of the below suggestions are meant to be the exclusive way
for states to ensure constitutional parole conditions for sex offenders.
Rather, they are suggestions for reform in places like Michigan, where
"no contact" restrictions are assigned automatically and rarely removed
absent intervention from advocates.
A. Streamlining the Decision to Grant Parole
and the Determination ofRisk
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize how states
make their initial parole decisions. In most jurisdictions, an offender is
eligible for parole when he has served the court-imposed mandatory
minimum for his sentence, less good time credits (if it is not a "truth-in-
sentencing" jurisdiction') or including disciplinary credits, where ap-
plicable.' Once an offender is parole-eligible, he or she typically
155. "Truth in sentencing" refers to the statutory requirement in some jurisdictions that
an offender serve a specific portion of their court-imposed sentence before he or she
may be considered for parole. See NAT'L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS ON TRUTH IN SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF LAW
AND LEGISLATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ACT OF 1994 (1995).
156. See, e.g., The Parole Consideration Process, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
http://www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,1607,7-119-1435-22909--,00.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 14, 2011).
514 [Vol. 18:485
"NO CONTACT" PAROLE RESTRICTIONS
applies to or goes before a state parole board to ask for parole release.15 1
In Michigan, a three-member panel of its Parole and Commutation
Board considers numerous factors in evaluating whether parole should
be granted, including, "the nature of the current offense, the prisoner's
criminal history, prison behavior, program performance, age, parole
guidelines score, risk as determined by various validated assessment in-
struments and information obtained during the prisoner's interview, if
one is conducted." 58
With all the detailed assessment that the Parole and Commutation
Board is required to conduct before releasing an offender on parole, it is
unclear why the Board does not consider assignment of appropriate pa-
role conditions as part of its review. One of the most significant
problems with Michigan's current system is that it automatically couples
offenses with conditions without reviewing the conditions each offender
truly needs. Moreover, Michigan's condition assignment process is done
by a computer program and never corrected by the parole board or an
inmate's parole officer. But if individual assessment is already happening
to determine parole eligibility, why not include assessment of the needed
parole conditions for each offender? How much additional time, effort,
or cost would be required of the state?
B. Determining a Baseline and Analyzing Risk Factors
If individualized assessment is constitutionally necessary, then the
real question becomes one of starting points. Should the Board really
have "default" conditions, which serve as a starting point? What should
those default conditions be, and what factors should trigger variations
from the default?
To uphold the constitutional right of parents to maintain relation-
ships with their children, the Board should start with the assumption
that an offender will not be a threat to his or her children, and only de-
part from that assumption if there is evidence to the contrary. Although
advocates have been unsuccessful in advancing this argument for restric-
tive conditions on residency or registration, 19 the unique constitutional
implications of separating an offender from his or her family call for start-
ing with a lower baseline and raising it only when necessary. To avoid
constitutional challenges, states should carefully tailor their means to their
ends by reserving the most restrictive conditions for the offenders who
157. See id.
158. Id
159. See generally Hobson, supra note 16, at 973-74.
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truly need them most. The default parole condition should be either
supervised or unsupervised visitation between the offender and his or
her children. Based on the individualized assessment, the Board can in-
crease the restrictiveness of an offender's condition from there, but only
in cases where it is truly necessary.
This leads to a second question: what should be taken into account
when determining whether an offender is truly a threat to his or her
family? According to experts, "recidivism rates vary based on the type of
offense and other risk factors such as offender age, degree of sexual devi-
ance, criminal history, and victim preference.""o In advocating on behalf
of individual clients in Michigan, the Michigan Clinical Law Program
considers the underlying offense, the age and gender of the victim, the
offender's connection to his or her family, the offender's progress in
therapy (both while incarcerated and while in the community), and the
personal preferences of the other biological parent. Although none of
these factors is dispositive, together they paint a picture of an offender's
ability to cope with his prior conviction and interact with his family and
children in positive, healthy, and meaningful ways.
There is little disagreement that a holistic approach is necessary to
determine what triggers an offender's criminal behavior and how to pre-
vent it. Yet, some scholars disagree on the degree to which an
offender's prior offense record may be predictive of the types of offenses
he or she may be inclined to commit in the future.16'2 This argument,
often referred to as the "cross-over effect," asserts that some individuals
who commit one type of sexual crime, such rape of an adult woman,
may also commit other types of sexual crimes, such as sexual assault of a
child, if given the opportunity to engage in more aggressive behavior.
Because of the cross-over effect, some argue, more restrictive conditions
160. Fortney et al., supra note 15.
161. See, e.g., Kim English, The Containment Approach to Managing Sex Offenders, 34
SETON HALL L. REv. 1255, 1263 (2004) [hereinafter English, Managing Sex Offend-
ers] (noting the importance of learning an offender's assault patterns, and once they
are known, creating "supervision and surveillance strategies that are customized to
each offender's" patterns); Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Of
fender Residence Restrictions: 1,000 Feet fom Danger or One Step fom Absurd?, 49
INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168, 175 (2005) (arguing that
"blanket restrictions may fail to address individualized risk factors that are related to
potential offending patterns").
162. Levenson & Cotter, supra note 161, at 175.
163. Kim English, The Containment Approach: An Aggressive Strategy for the Community
Management ofAdult Sex Offenders, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & LAw 218, 223-224
(1998) [hereinafter English, Aggressive Strategy]; see also Peggy Heil, Sean Ahlmeyer,
& Dominique Simons, Crossover Sexual Offenses, 15 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. OF RES. &
TREATMENT 221, 221 (2003).
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are needed to avoid giving "significant access to victims and an inordi-
nate amount of privacy with vulnerable children and adults," which may
result in "the approved parole plan . . . [being] the first step in an offi-
cially sanctioned opportunity for the offender to rape again."
But, reliance on the so-called "cross-over effect" in setting parole re-
strictions is speculative at best. There is little to no empirical basis
behind the idea that because an offender committed one type of sex of-
fense, against a victim of a particular age or gender, that he or she is
likely to commit sexual offenses against anyone else, regardless of age or
gender. Kim English, Research Director for the Colorado Department
of Corrections, who previously gave weight to the cross-over effect, 65
recently retreated from this stance, noting that Colorado's "containment
approach" to sex offenders was not based on the cross-over effect per se,
but rather the need to know the "assault history of each offender . . . so
that the duration, frequency, and variety of dangerous behavior is fully
known by those who intend to provide treatment and supervision." 6 6
Aside from the offense of conviction and individualized assessment
of sexual proclivities and risk factors, progress in therapy is an important
component in developing appropriate parole plans for each offender.
Recent studies have shown that sex offender therapy programs, coupled
with strong relapse prevention plans, may be quite effective in reducing
recidivism rates and curbing criminal tendencies among convicted sex
offenders."' Risk analysis conducted by the treating therapist at the
prison or jail would therefore be a useful tool for corrections administra-
tors and parole boards in deciding on appropriate parole conditions.
Therapists' reports will provide vital insight into the risk each particular
offender poses to his or her children. Although successful completion of
an empirically-based sex offender treatment program will almost never
be conclusive in and of itself, completion of therapy and a positive ther-
apy report are certainly important factors to consider in evaluating an
offender's potential dangerousness to his own family.
164. English, Aggressive Strategy, supra note 163, at 224.
165. English, Aggressive Strategy, supra note 163, at 224.
166. English, Managing Sex Offenders, supra note 161, at 1267.
167. See generally R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data
Project on the Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL
ABUSE: J. OF RES. & TREATMENT 169 (2002).
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C. Eliminating the Disconnect Between Visitation During Incarceration
and Visitation During Parole
Although there may be strong opposition to setting the default at
non-restrictive contact between sex offenders and their own children,
especially given the heinous cases usually presented by the news media,
perhaps the best argument in favor of such an approach is the fact that
offenders are permitted to interact with their families while they are still
incarcerated. Inmates serving active sentences are often allowed visita-
tion rights with their families-albeit only on certain days and at certain
times, and only after an application for visitation is approved.' Visita-
tion rights may be taken away, however, if the inmate is involved in an
altercation or disciplinary infraction within the facility, or if there are
institutional security concerns.' With the rare exception,O however,
the baseline rule adhered to by the MDOC is that all inmates are al-
lowed to visit with their minor children-even inmates in maximum-
. . . . .. * 171
security facilities and administrative segregation units.
Parsing the distinction between appropriate policies for inmates
versus parolees is important, particularly because a parolee's "condition
is very different from that of confinement in prison," in that a parolee
enjoys substantially more freedom and liberty than those who remain
incarcerated. 7 2 Although it is true that visitation rooms in prisons are
relatively controlled environments where the potential for abuse is low,
and inmates remain under the watchful eye of correctional officers at all
times, there is no reason to assume that such protections are impossible
in "free world" visitation as well. Perhaps, where necessary, some of the
methods of protection and safety utilized during visits to corrections
facilities could be required for home visits as well. Supervised visitation
168. See How Do I Visit a Prisoner?, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, http://
www.michigan.gov/corrections/0,1607,7-119-9741_12798-179676--,00.html (last
visited Jan. 25, 2011).
169. See generally Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003) (upholding restrictions
on visitation in part for reasons of institutional security, and because inmates had
other means to communicate with their loved ones, i.e. telephone calls and letters).
170. The MDOC requires special approval for an inmate's child to visit the inmate in
prison if that child was the victim of the inmate's criminal sexual conduct offense.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 168.
171. See Memorandum from Dennis M. Straub, Deputy Director, Correctional Facilities
Administration, Michigan Department of Corrections, to Wardens, Correctional Fa-
cilities Administration, Michigan Department of Corrections 3 (July 26, 2010),
available at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/Visiting-Standards_-
2007_209112_7.doc (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
172. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
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remains a perfectly viable equivalent. By requiring the presence of an
adult responsible for the child's well-being, or in special cases requiring
the presence of the parole officer, administrators can ensure the safety of
the children and avoid the significant constitutional violations caused by
no-contact restrictions.
CONCLUSION
As state and local lawmakers continue to move toward more re-
strictive parole conditions for sex offenders, it is worth pausing to ask
whether our policy goals are being met. Residency restrictions, regis-
tration requirements, and now, in some states, "no contact"
restrictions, serve only as bricks in walls we hope to build around
those whom we fear-individuals capable of sexually violating us, or
worse, our children. Yet, in our attempt to "contain" sex offenders,
one of the most complex and challenging groups involved in the crim-
inal justice system, we may not be doing what is actually best for our
communities. Public perceptions about sex offenders are greatly con-
tradicted by empirical research.' 7 1 Moreover, cutting offenders off from
society, and from their families in particular, may actually increase
their propensity to recidivate.
At the crossroads of public safety and constitutional rights, states
must think intelligently and compassionately about the relationship be-
tween a parolee and his or her child. Most offenders will pose no risk to
their children. The collateral consequences of family separation are
great, for offenders, their children, and the greater community. By con-
ducting case-by-case reviews of each offender to determine the
appropriate conditions for his or her parole, and by starting with the
presumption of the least restrictive alternative, states will go a long way
in potentially improving public safety and protecting the constitutional
rights of parolees. t
173. Jill S. Levenson, Yolanda N. Brannon, Timothy Fortney & Juanita Baker, Public
Perceptions About Sex Offenders and Community Protection Policies, 7 ANALYSES OF
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